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of Everyday Life 
 
 
Abstract: Drawing on medieval forensic rhetoric on one hand and performance studies on the 
other, I argue that a complex murder mystery of 1474 rivals any modern-day tale of “true 
crime” that we might imagine. Here, the investigation and punishment of murder are aided 
and abetted – but also foiled and avenged – by the principles and practices of spectatorship in 
the ultimate foul play. In addition to shedding new light on the spectacular nature of police 
deception during interrogations, this case demonstrates that the theatrical underpinnings of 
any legal verdict suggest not the “truth-speaking” of a literal verdict but the “true-seeming” 
of dramatic verisimilitude. Most troubling of all: as the legally believable joins the 
theatrically persuasive, crime is interpreted through literary conventions of dramatic 
emplotment, only to culminate in a finding of guilt and spectacular death penalty which are 
based on a dispositive absence of evidence. 
 
Résumé : Faisant appel à la rhétorique judiciaire et à la théorie de la 
performance (« performance studies »), il est possible d’avancer la proposition qu’il y existait 
un véritable « drame policier » au Moyen Âge. Un cas de meurtre de l’année 1474 révèle que 
l’enquête et la punition du crime sont incitées mais aussi vengées par les principes et les 
pratiques du spectacle. Tout en élucidant le caractère dramatique des interrogatoires 
policiers, le cas de 1474 démontre que, grâce à la théâtralité, le verdict juridique relève 
moins du « vrai-dire » que de la vraisemblance théâtrale. Dans l’imaginaire judiciaire, c’est 
la littérarité de l’intrigue qui explique les pièces à conviction du crime, la culpabilité se 
basant ici sur l’absence des preuves et menant, au dénouement troublant de cette histoire, au 
spectacle quintessentiel de la peine de mort. 
 
 
The year is 1474, the place, the great theatrical city of Metz, and the legal 
case, a “strange and evil thing that left many people much astonished”. As Philippe 
de Vigneulles tells the tale, the dramatis personae are as follows: the wealthy 
merchant and neglectful husband, Didier Baillat; his allegedly conspiratorial wife, 
Isabel; and the villain par excellence of the story, Didier’s unnamed legal secretary 
(le clerc) who, in coveting his employer’s wife, trades stylus for sword when he 
murders his employer.1 Theirs is a story of lust, rape-by-impersonation, blackmail, 
                                                
1 La Chronique de Philippe de Vigneulles, hereafter CPV, ed. C. Bruneau, 4 vols., Metz, 
Société d’histoire et d’archéologie de la Lorraine, 1927-1933, vol. III, p. 33-35; in the 
Appendix, I reproduce the entire Middle French text as is, all its orthographic peculiarities 
included. All translations from the French are my own and I have largely favored spirit over 
strict literalism. For clarity in my own narrative and citations, I have added punctuation, 
diacritical marks, modernized several spelling conventions (for example, v for u; j for i), 




conspiracy, murder, the staging of a false scene of the crime, legal discovery, police 
interrogations, confessions misleadingly obtained, and a community’s retribution 
that is crowned by dual spectacles of the scaffold.2 With dramatic story arcs of 
deception and disguise that rival those of a Boccaccio, an ersatz Martin Guerre, or a 
medieval playwright, this document from the annals of history emerges, as does so 
much of the history of the medieval French theater itself, from the shadows of crime 
and punishment.3 For historians, it offers a window on medieval police procedures 
for interrogation; for literary critics and theorists, it is the quintessential histoire 
about the past and, as such, consonant with what Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz 
would later call “law’s stories”.4 As relevant to theater history as to legal history, the 
case of Didier Baillat demonstrates that the interpretation of theatrical and 
antitheatrical behavior informs the numerous truth claims that we process every day, 
be it correctly or incorrectly. 
In this essay, drawing on both forensic rhetoric and performance theory, I 
argue that the investigation and punishment of murder are aided and abetted – but 
also foiled and avenged – by the principles and practices of spectatorship in the 
ultimate foul play. Indeed, forensic rhetoric is very much where the history of 
                                                
names. I use interchangeably the terms “legal secretary” and “clerk.” Another version of the 
story, taken largely from Philippe’s account, appears in editor J. F. Huguenin’s compilation of 
several chronicles, Les Chroniques de la ville de Metz, recueillies, mises en ordre et publiées 
pour la première fois. Le Doyen de St. Thiébault. – Jean Aubrion. – Philippe de Vigneulles. – 
Praillon. – Annales Messines, etc., 900-1552, hereafter CVM, Metz, S. Lamort, 1838, p. 413-
414. For an infamous “death by stylus”, see R. Copeland, “Introduction: Dissenting Critical 
Practices”, Criticism and Dissent, ed. R. Copeland, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 1-23. 
2 Here I draw, of course, on M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans. A. Sheridan, New York, Pantheon, 1977, chap. 1:2, entitled “The Spectacle of the 
Scaffold”. 
3 See N. Z. Davis’s discovery and brilliant analysis of the equally dramatic Return of Martin 
Guerre, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983, the ultimate tale of lust and 
impersonation. On the legal sources of the earliest extant records of medieval French theater 
history, see my discussion of three violent incidents of 1380, 1384, and 1395 in Murder by 
Accident: Medieval Theater, Modern Media, Critical Intentions, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2009, chaps. 1-3. L. Petit de Julleville found only a handful of earlier 
fragmentary records from 1290, 1333, 1351, and 1376, which he cataloged chronologically in 
Les Mystères, vols. I and II of Histoire du théâtre en France, 1880; rpt. Geneva, Slatkine, 
1968, vol. I, p. 2-5. For an astute historical perspective, see E. Muir and G. Ruggiero, 
“Introduction: The Crime of History”, History from Crime, trans. C. B. Curry, M. A. Galluci, 
and M. M. Galluci, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. vii-xviii. 
4 See Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Brooks and Gewirtz, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1996. Also highly recommended: the classic introductions to the topic 
by R. Weisberg and J-P. Barricelli, “Literature and Law”, Interrelations of Literature, ed. 
Barricelli and J. Gibaldi, New York, MLA, 1982, p. 150-175; R. Posner, Law and Literature: 
A Misunderstood Relation, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988; and, more recently, 
G. Binder and R. Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2000. 




rhetoric begins. As legal theorists from the Rhetorica ad Herennium to today’s 
proponents of the legal-storytelling movement have pointed out consistently, legal 
investigation, interrogation, and trial are all about creating a plausible story, a legal 
histoire. The forensic rhetorical tradition has ever codified the fundamental premise 
that, by dint of its reliance on probabilities and verisimilitude, the law tells and 
retells stories, the better to find (invenire) and, oftentimes, to create the legal truth 
that will be authorized as a literal verdict or truth-speaking (voir dit).5 As far as the 
case of 1474 is concerned, no reader of Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish 
would be surprised to see that a spectacular public execution closes a murder case by 
inscribing the supposed truth of the perpetrators’ criminality upon their bodies. What 
might well surprise, though, is that, in this medieval murder mystery, it is not 
spectacle that leads to the truth of the crime but, rather, something even more 
dispositive: the absence of spectacle. As we shall see, this particular legal verdict 
has less to do with things said and more to do with the true-seeming of things unsaid 
or never spoken at all (non dit). A complicated tale of true crime that rivals any 
modern-day “police drama” we might imagine, this case documents the importance 
of silences, absences, pretense, and spectacle in the law. It memorializes the legal, 
rhetorical, and theatrical power to authenticate so-called legal truths by analyzing 
things that are not there. While absent presences have served as the cornerstone of 
many modern feminist approaches to the legal story-telling movement,6 if anything, 
the story of Didier Baillat will reveal that absences can be imitated, interpreted, and 
punished. 
What, then, is the relationship between enacted storytelling and legal truth? 
To answer that question is to interrogate the role of theater, theatricality, feigning, 
role-playing, and performance in everyday life.7 If the law is always about the 
interpretation of signs, its stories can be equally dependent upon the interpretation of 
an absence of signs or of signs of things absent. In fact, absences dominate the entire 
case of 1474, all related historiographically to another especially telling 
historiographical absence: that of the perspective of Isabel. Perhaps most surprising: 
for all the interpretational difficulties, for all our justified, contemporary mistrust – 
even contempt – of a confession-centered medieval legal process of inquisition that 
included torture,8 for the all untruths authorized as ostensible medieval verdicts, the 
truth about Didier’s murder does indeed appear to have emerged from such an 
absence of signs, at least with the correct identification of the legal secretary as the 
perpetrator. Specifically, if murder will out, then that was the case in Metz because 
those seeking the truth of the matter failed to encounter the one crucial sign that was 
not there when they deemed that it should have been. From Isabel and the clerk, 
                                                
5 This is the primary argument of my Medieval Theater of Cruelty: Rhetoric, Memory, 
Violence, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999. 
6 See, e.g., D. A. Farber and S. Sherry, “Legal Storytelling and Constitutional Law: The 
Medium and the Message”, Law’s Stories, ed. Brooks and Gewirtz, p. 37-53. 
7 Needless to say, I draw inspiration here from M. de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 
trans. S. Rendall, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988; and A. Read, Theatre and 
Everyday Life: An Ethics of Performance, London and New York: Routledge, 1993. 
8 See, e.g., E. Peters on confession as the “queen of proofs”, Torture, 1985; expanded ed., 




nobody saw the proper, public display of mourning because, they surmised, the 
proper inner sentiments of sorrow to be represented must themselves have been 
absent. 
The complexity of the events is such that a brief summary is essential to the 
exposition of the present argument, which will reprise Philippe’s narrative. 
Notwithstanding Alan Dershowitz’s convincing assertion that “Life is Not a 
Dramatic Narrative”,9 the murder of Didier Baillat was nothing if not dramatic as it 
played out in in six acts: 
 
Prologue: Setting the Scene. Philippe introduces the cast of characters and their 
social and marital situations. Didier is an important landowner; his wife, Isabel, is a 
beautiful woman of good repute and breeding (who has failed nonetheless to capture 
the heart of her husband); and the unnamed legal secretary is a dashing and 
intelligent young man. Spurred on by another master protagonist – the Devil 
himself, who is mentioned no fewer than three times in the narrative – the legal 
secretary is inflamed with lust for Isabel and becomes a voyeuristic audience of his 
employer’s interactions with Isabel (or lack thereof). 
 
Act I: Rape by Impersonation. On one fateful night, after an extended period of 
veritable surveillance, the clerk pretends to be Didier and tricks Isabel into sex, 
resulting in what might initially have been accidental on her part but which 
eventually becomes a no less criminal, ongoing adultery. 
 
Act II: Criminal Conspiracy and Homicide. The clerk and Isabel conspire to 
commit the murder of Didier. Allegedly with Isabel’s consent – and with almost 
Boccaccian overtones – he murders Didier by hitting him with a large kitchen 
implement while Didier is on his way to the latrine. 
 
Act III: Staging a False Scene of the Crime. Late on a Saturday night, the 
conspirators move the body and deposit it outside a tavern where rabble-rousers are 
known to gather after drinking. The clerk and Isabel hope that this false evidence 
will deflect suspicion away from them; and, at first, their plan works. Several men 
who are innocent of Didier’s murder are questioned. 
 
Act IV: Absent Spectacles of Mourning. The criminal couple is undone by 
something that they fail to represent and do. Suspicion falls upon them because of 
their apparent absence of grief in the wake of the death of an employer and husband. 
 
Act V: Arrests and Interrogations. The arrest of the coconspirators ensues, 
followed by a criminal investigation and interrogation by the police, who use 
trickery and deception to extract Isabel’s confession when that same technique fails 
with the clerk. Her confession then elicits his. 
 
                                                
9 Dershowitz, “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative”, Law’s Stories, ed. Brooks and Gewirtz, 
p. 99-105. 




Act VI: Two Spectacular Death Penalties. In the name of Justice, both the clerk 
and Isabel are executed in a true spectacle of the scaffold. The clerk’s hands are cut 
off prior to his decapitation; and Isabel is burned at the stake. 
 
 
At stake here, then: a lascivious clerk observes an absence of marital 
affection – Didier does not care for his wife – which prompts him to impersonate his 
employer in order to commit the rape of Isabel.10 His skilled, disingenuous, 
manipulative, and criminal representation of the signs of indifference cuts straight to 
the heart of what law and theater share: imitations must be verisimilar; they must 
seem probable. In 1474, what seemed unverisimilar and improbable to the 
community of Messins was the absence of something: the canonical display of the 
conspirators’ grief, the presence of which should have required no pretense at all. In 
place of what ought to have been an excellent, possibly feigned spectacle of 
mourning, the community witnessed an unintentional spectacle of indifference: an 
absent spectacle of absent feeling. Murder will out, it appears, because even the 
finest play-acting can last for only so long. In 1474, murder did out at a key moment 
when theatricality and pretense were themselves absent. They were absent at the 
ordinarily theatrical moment of mourning which, in this instance, was distinctly 
antitheatrical: the criminals stopped performing, stopped play-acting. As the legally 
believable joined the theatrically verisimilar to fuel a community’s quest for justice, 
the absence of evidence was related to the absence of spectacle, all to be punished in 
the end by a spectacle of a very different order of magnitude at the legal and 
theatrical denouement: dismemberment and burning at the stake. The moral of the 
story? Appearances can be deceiving. And yet, in most criminal cases – absent or 
pending a criminal’s confession – appearances alone are available for interpretation. 
Appearances constitute the foul matter of the foul play. 
When referring to the community values that shaped the earliest laws, the 
ancient Greeks invoked doxa, or the “common opinion” that ostensibly embodied 
their shared ethical foundations or “orthodoxy”. The Romans used a different term 
for that “common opinion”: the rumor populi or the people’s “popular judgment” 
and “common talk”. So it was that, in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (one of the most 
widely disseminated rhetorical manuals of the learned European Middle Ages), the 
Pseudo-Cicero depicted the metamorphosis of suspicion into legal truth. In a closing 
statement for a murder trial, for instance, a lawyer was to submit that the evidentiary 
signs of the crime (indicia) added up with all the episodic coherence of a dramatic 
plot: 
                                                
10 While the term “marital rape” might seem anachronistic for fifteenth-century France, it is 
unclear to me that quibbling over semantics changes a woman’s actual experience of sexual 
domination by force. K. Gravdal was among the first to call our attention to the phenomenon 
in Ravishing Maidens: Writing Rape in Medieval French Literature and Law, Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991; superb historical work on this topic includes B. 
Hanawalt, “Whose Story Was This? Rape Narratives in Medieval English Courts”, Of Good 
and Ill Repute: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 124-141; and S. M. Butler, The Language of Abuse: Marital 




If, before the victim was murdered, the defendant was seen, alone, in the place in 
which the murder was committed; if soon afterward, during the very commission of 
the crime, the voice of the victim was heard; if it is established that then, after the 
murder, the defendant returned home, at dead of night; that on the next day he spoke 
of the man’s murder haltingly and inconsistently – if all these indications are proved, 
partly by witnesses, and partly by the confessions upon torture which have been 
adduced in confirmation, and by public opinion, which, born of evidence, must 
necessarily be true [et rumore populi, quem ex argumentis natum necesse est esse 
verum]; then, gentlemen, it is your duty to gather all these indications into one, and 
arrive at definite knowledge, not suspicion, of the crime [scientiam, non suspicionem 
maleficii].11 
 
The disturbing conclusion? A reasonable amount of circumstantial 
evidence – that is, visible signs ever subject to interpretation based on their 
probability and verisimilitude – had the rhetorical power, in the eyes of the law, to 
convert the rumor populi into fact or “definite knowledge” (scientia). 
This is no postmodern phenomenological exercise à la Baudrillard, as in his 
famous scenario about pretending to shoplift: “the same gestures and the same signs 
exist as for a real theft; in fact the signs incline neither to one side nor the other”.12 In 
1474, the signs of murder eventually did “incline toward one side or the other”. It is 
the very mission of the law is to guarantee such inclination toward one side only as it 
transforms circumstantial evidence, even rumor, into enduringly performative legal 
truth. Thus, in Metz, the law transformed suspicion into definite knowledge by 
“gathering into one” all the indicia discernible post hoc from the comportment of 
Isabel and the clerk, but with an emphasis on indicia absent. The question is: how 
do members of the legal profession along with everyday citizens become interpreters 
and judges of the signs of a crime? 
I have often argued that, in a medieval culture that, for Jacques Le Goff, 
“played itself out” in one glorious spectacle,13 everyday citizens learned those habits 
not only from the probabilities of rhetoric but from the verisimilitude of the most 
accessible literary medium of the day, theater.14 Aristotle himself had once 
recommended that the authors of fiction were to prefer plausible stories that were 
false-but-probable to truths that strained credibility: “a convincing impossibility is 
preferable to that which is unconvincing though possible”.15 A convincing 
probability trumped a seemingly improbable but no less factual truth, all the more so 
when that truth seemed improbable and unverisimilar. Despite Dershowitz’s legally 
                                                
11 [Cicero], Ad C. Herennium, ed. and trans. H. Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, 1954; rpt. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977, bk. IV, chap. 53, my emphasis. See also my 
Medieval Theater of Cruelty, op. cit., p. 28-38. 
12 “Simulacra and Simulations”, Selected Writings, ed. and trans. M. Poster, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1988, p. 78; discussed below at greater length. 
13 Le Goff, Medieval Civilization, 400-1500, trans. Julia Barrow, 1988, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1995, p. 360-361. 
14 See my Medieval Theater of Cruelty, chap. 1. 
15 Poetics, 1461b, ed. and trans. W. H. Fyfe, Aristotle, Longinus, Demetrius, Loeb Classical 
Library, 1927; rpt. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1946. 




astute contention that “life does not imitate art” and that “events are often simply 
meaningless, irrelevant to what comes next; events can be out of sequence, random, 
purely accidental, without purpose”, the probabilistic rhetoric of law imposes 
conventions of verisimilitude upon real life.16 In the forensic rhetorical tradition, in 
the interpretation of acts committed and omitted, it is theatrical verisimilitude – not 
real life – that makes narratives cohere. Indeed, a fascinating later example of 
precisely what the Pseudo-Cicero describes above survives in the fifteenth-century 
Mistere de la Sainte Hostie,17 which concludes when a magistrate steps forward to 
cite an identical transformation of suspicion (commun bruict, the French equivalent 
of the rumor populi) into legal “truth”. He proudly announces that the execution of 
an evil woman who has sold the sacred host to a Jew has validated the truth of all the 
gossip and rumors: “The Law has been informed. / You have been accused of a 
heinous crime… / What is true is what is rumored [La voir est, et le commun 
bruict]: / That you yourself are the perpetrator.”18 If, as the Pseudo-Cicero 
maintained, it was the business of the law to interpret signs, it was the business of 
literature to provide the skills to do just that it. Nor has it ever been necessary to be a 
schooled rhetorician to qualify for that task. 
In the De doctrina christiana, Saint Augustine had once outlined the process 
by which cultures give their “common consent” to the reading of signs. He did so by 
drawing a clear analogy to pantomime, which had once required an expositor to 
explain the meaning of its signs. In the strictest sense, non-members of a given 
community do not speak the same language of signs: 
 
If those signs which the actors make in their dances had a natural meaning and not a 
meaning dependent on the institution and consent of men, the public crier in early 
times would not have had to explain to the Carthaginian populace what the dancer 
wished to convey during the pantomime… [E]ven now if anyone unacquainted with 
such trifles goes to the theater and no one else explains to him what these motions 
signify, he watches the performance in vain. It is true that everyone seeks a certain 
verisimilitude in making signs so that these signs, in so far as is possible, may 
resemble the things that they signify. But since one thing may resemble another in a 
great variety of ways, signs are not valid among men except by common consent 
[Appetunt tamen omnes quandam similitudinem in significando, ut ipsa signa, 
quantum possunt, rebus, quae significantur, similia sint. Sed quia multis modis 
                                                
16 “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative”, op. cit., p. 100-101. 
17 Drawing on the decisive work of such scholars as H. G. Harvey and R. H. Bloch, I explored 
the medieval French theatrical obsession with the law in Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval 
Drama, Rhetoric and Society, 1, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992. See Harvey, The 
Theatre of the Basoche, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941; and Bloch’s 
groundbreaking analysis of the fictionalizing possibilities of the legal inquest in Medieval 
French Literature and Law, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, chap. 4. 
18 Le Mistere de la Sainte Hostie, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Réserve Yf 2915 (Paris, 
n.d.), fol. 34v, my emphasis. I discuss this text at length in connection with a spectacular death 
penalty comparable to that of the case of 1474 in “Theater Makes History: Ritual Murder by 




simile aliquid alicui potest esse, non constant talia signa inter homines, nisi 
consensus accedat.]19 
 
In late medieval Metz, the community spoke the same language and, in a 
very real way, communities are defined by how they interpret signs. Truth-
production is man-made, community-made, and theater-made in a medieval culture 
in which theatrical verisimilitude was part of daily life. 
 
Prologue: Setting the Scene. It should have been a match made in heaven 
but, instead, it literally went to the Devil. The well-respected businessman, Didier 
Baillat, owned “an oven and mills and several other inheritances”: “he was a very 
important man, for he was most intelligent and trustworthy; and he always 
frequented the nobility.” He had married “one of the [most] beautiful bourgeoises of 
the city of Metz, a sweet and lovely woman who was honest and, along with that, of 
good lineage, of good name, and, additionally, considered by all the citizens of Metz 
to be a noble woman of good repute” (CPV, vol. III, p. 33). Although Philippe does 
not name her, another chronicler does: she is Isabel, the daughter of the merchant, 
Jehan de Toul (CVM, p. 413). And yet, despite the promise of the union, it seems 
that Didier simply did not care for Isabel, such that it was well known throughout 
town that he was leading a dissolute life with a mistress. In the Chroniques de la 
Ville de Metz, he is characterized as a gambler and a carouser (ung jueur et ribleur 
de nuyt) (p. 413); whereas Philippe reports that the aforesaid Didier, her husband, 
taking no account of her, was known to be keeping another woman; and, in fact, he 
could barely leave her side night and day, such that, more often than not, he only 
returned home after midnight “to go to bed” (CPV, vol. III, p. 33). 
Enter a third party, Didier’s legal secretary (ung clerc du stille du Pallas20), a 
“dashing young man and very well-mannered” who resided in the couple’s home 
and who assisted Didier “in all his affairs”. “Be it night or day”, continues Philippe, 
Didier “had his secretary drive him there, after which, the aforesaid secretary 
returned to the manor” (CPV, vol. III, p. 33). Enter, now, the Devil in the flesh, who 
had a hand in the story: “all of it happened in such a way that the Devil got in the 
middle of it [ce y bouta] and, through temptation, inflamed the secretary with love 
for his mistress” – and readers of medieval literature immediately recognize the 
troubling tendency to qualify lust as amour. The story takes it first metatheatrical 
twist when the lascivious clerk becomes a voyeuristic audience of something that is 
not there. He becomes an impassioned spectator of a husband plopping down into 
bed (se bouter, the same verb used above for what the Devil did); he is an 
understudy of the absence of marital affection: 
 
                                                
19 Augustine of Hippo, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr., 1958; rpt. 
Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill, 1980, bk. 2, chap. 25, secs. 38-39, p. 61. For the Latin edition, 
see, Aurelii Augustini Opera, Corpus christianorum, vol. XXXII, Turnhout, Brepols, 1957, 
p. 60. 
20 Although we find the curious spelling of Pallas, this has little do with Athena. It is, in all 
likelihood, the “style of the ‘palace’” as in the halls of justice: this is someone well versed in 
legalese, lawyerly pleadings, etc. 




And he had them in his sights for so long that he saw what gestures and countenance 
his master displayed when he returned home at night after the mistress was already 
in bed [Et tant espia qu’il vit quel geste et contenance son dit maistre faisoit quant il 
retournoit de nuyt à l’ostel et que la maîtresse estoit couchée]: that is, that the 
aforesaid Didier got into bed beside her [ce boutoit auprès d’elle] and, without 
uttering a word, went to sleep. (CPV, vol. III, p. 33; my emphasis) 
 
Highly capable of penetrating the appearances of any marriage, the clerk next 
prepares his own rendition of that marital indifference. Absence, it seems, was easy 
to mimic; and one can only wonder whether there would have been a different 
denouement had Didier himself playacted marital affection a bit more and offered up 
a bit less the habitual spectacle of the non-acts representing his lack of love. 
 
Act I: Rape-by-Impersonation. Swearing that he has testimony from “those 
in the daily company of the aforesaid secretary, and who were thus in a position to 
know”, Philippe de Vigneulles next describes the clerk’s sinister performance of a 
lifetime. As any method-actor might do today, the clerk prepared his role by 
internalizing Didier Baillat’s ritual.21 One night when the master of the house was 
away on business, he snuck into Isabel’s bed, no longer solely a voyeur but a 
consummate actor expert in the sine qua non of theater, impersonation:22 
 
…One night, when he knew that his master was not going to be returning home, he 
stole away in secret and went to lie down next to his mistress; and, after a few other 
things, pretending that he was his aforementioned master, he had consortium with 
his mistress [et, après plusieurs chose, faindant qu’il fût ledit son maistre, olt la 
compaignie de sa maîtresse]. As one can easily imagine, she noticed the deception 
relatively quickly [essés tost], but it was still too late [tropts tairt]. (CPV, vol. III, p. 
33; my emphasis) 
 
At this point, Philippe is silent about a number of crucial issues; and, in an 
unfolding narrative that is ultimately about the role of probability and verisimilitude 
in the interpretation of the signs that create truth, this particular aspect of the story 
strains legal credibility – if not theatrical plotting – to its breaking point. As the 
numerous silences of this case are compounded by the usual historiographical 
absences to which medievalists are accustomed when putting together the puzzle of 
sources, one of the first discrepancies is related to the standpoint of Isabel. There are 
things that should have been stated about her that are not stated, neither here at this 
decisive moment nor anywhere else. First, what were those “few other things” that 
                                                
21 I invoke here the celebrated trilogy of C. Stanislavski, all three volumes translated by E. R. 
Hapgood: An Actor Prepares, New York, Theatre Arts, 1936; Building a Character, New 
York, Theatre Arts, 1949; and Creating a Role, 1961; rpt. New York, Routledge, Theatre 
Arts, 1988. 
22 On the idea of impersonation as paramount in medieval dramatic theory, see, e.g., O. B. 
Hardison, Jr., Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages: Essays in the Origin 
and Early History of Modern Drama, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965, 




the clerk did before initiating his feigning alongside Didier’s wife? And second, 
what exactly does Philippe mean by “relatively quickly but still too late” (CPV, vol. 
III, p. 34)? Was Isabel in the habit of submitting to marital relations with her eyes 
closed? How could Philippe or any of his allegedly reliable sources have possibly 
come to know anything about the dastardly impersonation at all? Did this 
information come from the mouth of the clerk himself and, if so, whom did he tell? 
Were there other voyeurs observing the already voyeuristic clerk? Was Philippe 
fictionalizing for the sake of storytelling, proffering a literary rendition in which 
Isabel emerges as Didier’s Ygraine to the clerk’s Uther Pendragon? Is this another 
case of what Natalie Zemon Davis has termed “fiction in the archives”?23 Is it a 
Martin Guerre-like story in which, by touch alone, Isabel knew instantly that the 
man beside her was not her husband but a handsome young man whom she might 
have desired (and whose desire is relevant here only to the extent that it concerns her 
culpability)? 
It is impossible to obtain definitive answers to those questions but two 
elements in particular warrant our attention. First, Philippe’s knowledge of these 
events might well derive from his close relationship with Didier Baillat himself, for 
whom he had worked as an apprentice.24 A second thing is certain: in relating with 
literary flair a fait divers that has captured his attention, Philippe has also provided a 
harrowing commentary about medieval women’s experience of marital sex. Multiple 
times, Isabel is the victim of her own story, not acting so much as acted upon, a 
victim whose voice and perspective are left in the dark. In Philippe’s hands, as in 
those of the protagonists manhandling her throughout – a husband, a clerk, the 
police, an executioner – Isabel debuts as the victim of her husband’s neglect, only to 
be tricked or forced into sex and coerced into continuing: “and, since the clerk 
humiliated her [le clerc la humiliait], telling her all about the life led by her lord and 
master, along with a number of other things (besoingne), little by little, he managed 
to ensnare and tame her, tricking her into his web of deceit” (CPV, vol. III, p. 33). 
Through lust, impersonation, and a real – not imitated – coercion, the clerk has 
tricked a good woman into possibly accidental but no less criminal adultery, which 
alleged “relationship” continues for some time, the duration of which is unknown. 
Philippe announces only that, “afterward, a number of other things having been said 
and done [et, après plusieurs aultre chose faictes et dicte]”, a criminal conspiracy 
ensued. 
His silence on the subject is a literally pregnant pause. When our narrator 
goes on to complete this ambiguous chronology with the couple’s arrest, he reveals 
that Isabel had just given birth. To fast-forward momentarily to the denouement: she 
“had just recently given birth to a child and had been considering marrying the 
aforesaid clerk” (CPV, vol. III, p. 34). When was the child conceived and who was 
                                                
23 N. Z. Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century 
France, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987. 
24 For this information, see Bruneau’s introduction to CPV, vol. I, p. v-vi. For a helpful 
introduction to our narrator, see also C. M. Jones, Philippe de Vigneulles and the Art of Prose 
Translation, Woodbridge, Eng., D. S. Brewer, 2008. 




its father? Once again, enter the Devil.25 Given that he oftentimes cites the Devil’s 
role in forced sexual relations that would likely be termed “marital rape” today, and 
given the larger medieval context of diabolical urban legendry associated with 
theatrical life, it is entirely consistent with medieval folklore that Isabel conceived a 
child on the night of the rape. Consider such a celebrated example as the Miracle 
Play of the Child Given to the Devil, in which a husband imposes himself sexually 
upon his wife, who curses him out, saying that, since the rape was the Devil’s doing, 
then, if there were to be a child, it could “go to the devil”. (Un)naturally, a child 
results from that union as well.26 With regard to the case of Didier Baillat, his clerk, 
and his wife, we know nothing of the fate of Isabel’s child, who is mentioned only in 
the context of Isabel’s arrest and never mentioned again. Its fate might well have 
had something to do with the brutality of her eventual punishment. 
 
Act II: Criminal Conspiracy and Homicide. Philippe speculates that, while 
all was going well with the criminal couple, the pair remained unsated nonetheless, 
with Isabel suddenly an agent in the proceedings: “notwithstanding the life that they 
were leading and the grand old time they were having, the Devil tempted them with 
homicide [non comptant de la vie qu’il menoient et de la bonne chier qu’il faisoient, 
le dyable les tantait d’omicide].” The language of the extant sources is ambiguous as 
to who initiates the conspiracy but Philippe frames it as a mutual promise. A number 
of translations are possible, one in which she extracts a promise from him, another 
that the couple promised one another, and, given Philippe’s agrammatical 
renditions, yet another in which “the aforesaid bourgeoise promised this aforesaid 
clerk that she would consent to [be complicit in] the death of the aforesaid Didier, 
her husband [et olt la dicte bourgeoise promesse avec le dit clerc d’estre consentent 
de la mort dudit Dediet, son mary]” (CPV, vol. III, p. 34). Regardless of who 
elicited the promise from whom, regardless of the sketchiness surrounding Isabel’s 
own motivations, what we do know is that the penalty for murder (Act VI) was to be 
much more severe for her. Conspiracy (coniuratio) was a serious crime in the 
Middle Ages, as evidenced by the longstanding wisdom compiled in the medieval 
legal compilation known as the Digest of Justinian. For example, in the context of 
robbery, the teachings of Claudius Saturninus addressed both “things counseled” 
and “guilty knowledge”: “the scale of the crime is the same for those who aid others 
by advice [ut coniurationes et latronum conscientia quosque alios suadendo iuvisse 
                                                
25 Philippe was on stage in 1512, e.g., in the play of Esther. See his Gedenkbuch des Metzer 
Bürgers Philippe von Vigneulles aus den Jahren 1471-1522, ed. Heinrich Michelant, 
Stuttgart, Litterarischer verein, 1852; and rpt. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1968, p. 222. 
26 On the theatrical role of the Devil in marital rape, see my Murder by Accident, op. cit., 
chap. 3; and Death by Drama and Other Medieval Urban Legends, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2002, chap. 8. According to Jacomin Husson, the Miracle of the Child was 
even performed in Metz many years later on 10 October 1512; see La Chronique de Metz de 
Jacomin Husson, 1200-1525, publié d’après le manuscrit autographe de Copenhague et celui 




sceleris est instar].”27 In 1474, this medieval version of mens rea would next take an 
ominous turn. 
The deed was done on Saturday, 18 June by the clerk, who killed Didier 
“with a large rod with which one normally beats sauces [celluy clerc, en alumant 
son maistre, qui alloit a retrait, le tuait d’ung pétal à quoy on s’aide à broyer 
saulce]; and, the deed done, he went to tell his mistress all about it” (CPV, vol. III, 
p. 34).28 In a narrative that becomes increasingly and bizarrely Boccaccian with a 
large kitchen implement normally employed in “sauce-making”29 and the clerk 
“lighting the way for his master, who was going to the privy”, one is even tempted 
to inquire whether this could be a euphemistic going to the bathroom with Didier 
actually on the toilet.30 Either way – tragi-comic dimensions notwithstanding – the 
murder precipitates one of the most strikingly tragic presences of the entire tale. 
Although Philippe virtually ignores throughout Isabel’s capacity for any 
agency other than the criminal variety, at the moment of truth he notices, almost in 
passing, the widow’s true – not false – remorse, only to postulate that it was of no 
account. In a narrative in which absences become presences, it is as if a true 
presence might just as well have been absent: “And she, seeing that her husband was 
dead, was very sad and grief-stricken [fort triste et dollante]. Be that as it may, there 
was nothing to be done about it; the deed was done” (CPV, vol. III, p. 34; my 
emphasis). There was, however, something else to be done as Isabel is caught up in 
the aftermath of the crime: the conspirators needed to hide the body. 
 
Act III: Staging a False Scene of the Crime. Perhaps most germane to legal 
thinking itself, the murderous clerk and Isabel attempt to interfere with the 
interpretation of signs by staging false clues at a false scene of the true crime. 
Having initially concealed Didier’s body behind some boards, the couple waited 
until midnight on that deadly Saturday, and then stole into town in order to deposit 
the corpse near the Teste d’Or, a tavern where drunks were known to congregate. Its 
placement there in the wee hours might easily create the impression that a possibly 
drunk Didier – he was a “carouser” after all (CVM, p. 413) – had met with foul play 
at the hands of other drunken rabble-rousers. Indeed, Philippe claims that the couple 
                                                
27 The Digest of Justinian, trans. A. Watson, 2 vols., Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1985; for the Latin, see Digesta, in Corpus iuris civilis, ed. T. Mommsen and P. 
Krueger, Berlin, Weidmann, 1877, vol. 2, bk. 48, chap. 19, sec. 16. Also available on-line 
only is an excellent essay by Tom Stenson in which he considers, in the context of 
international law, the wisdom of the Digest of Justininan regarding criminal conspiracy: 
“Inchoate Crimes and Criminal Responsibility under International Law”, esp. at p. 5-7: 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/1-1_Stenson_Thomas.pdf 
28 Normally, a pétal or pétard is a small explosive device (firecracker, bomb, mine, etc.). 
Context makes clear, however, that this is some kind of kitchen implement, a beater of some 
kind. 
29 This would be a sinister pun in the contemporary vernacular, in which sauce-making is a 
synonym for the sex act; also, broyer is associated with “cracking nuts”. 
30 It lies beyond the scope of the present study to expound upon the ubiquity of the privy in 
medieval lore and farce; but suffice it to say that Philippe elsewhere links it to infanticide: 
see, e.g., my “Theater Makes History”, op. cit. 




devised their subterfuge “so that people would believe that some of those criminal 
types had dumped him there under cover of darkness [affin qu’il fût cuydé que 
aulcuns ces mal vueullent l’eussent illec despechiez de nuyt]”. In short, the couple 
deployed make-believe in the service of making others believe in an alternate reality 
that was contrary to fact. They were engaged in the quintessential dramatic 
emplotment. Surely, they were hoping that the false indicia that they had 
manufactured would add up to a truth that was not one but which would seem 
nevertheless to be one inasmuch as the signs cohered with all the verisimilitude of 
any tragedy. 
At the same time, when Isabel and the clerk distributed false indicators of a 
crime, their plot might have been drawn straight from the pages of the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium. Any proverbial “reasonable person” would surely interpret the 
deceptive, circumstantial evidence to the couple’s advantage by “gather[ing] all 
these indications into one, and arriv[ing] at definite knowledge” (bk. IV, chap. 3). 
Needless to say, I am not suggesting that criminals were in the habit of consulting 
forensic rhetorical manuals for advice about how to cover up a crime; but it is 
crucial to bear in mind that the history of rhetoric itself was written based on what 
worked in the courtroom. At least at first, this well-wrought conspiracy works. The 
fabricated indicia designed to target the usual suspects led, on Sunday morning, to a 
police investigation of a different group of mal veullants: “several men were arrested 
immediately”, says Philippe, “even though they didn’t know anything about it” 
(CPV, vol. III, p. 34). Still, it did not take long for the couple’s story to unravel, 
leading not to ongoing falsehood but to what appears to be the legal truth of this 
matter. It is fascinating to see why. 
Every murder tells a story. In Act III, we find a murderous clerk seeking to 
create such a story: a false but credible story that will trump the truth (because, ever 
since Aristotle, truth has been the poor theatrical stepchild to probabilities and 
verisimilitude). Be that as it may, the Messin public came to mistrust what they were 
seeing and not seeing. When if came to the public responses by Isabel and the clerk, 
where were the signs of their grief? Absent, of course. Once the feigning stopped, it 
was that absence that seemed unconvincing because unverisimilar. 
 
Act IV: The Absent Spectacles of Mourning. As is still the case today, 
mourning is not an exclusively private event (as in the instantly recognizable black 
costume or in the wake). For all of his earlier expertise in imitating the absence of 
Didier’s marital affection, curiously, the clerk does not follow through with the 
remaining requisite spectacle, the presence of which was the only logical conclusion 
to this drama: he failed to provide the public performance of what would have been, 
for him, a feigned grief. It turns out that the citizens of Metz were also able to read 
the signs of things absent. 
Far and away the most stunning moment of the case is also its most 
dispositive one from a legal standpoint. Faced with the absence of mourning, the 
Messins interpreted the not-seen, not-spoken, and not-enacted as the not-felt, which 
inflamed their suspicions, a phenomenon that is by no means limited to the Middle 
Ages. One need only follow any sensational murder trial to learn that trial 
watchers – voyeurs? – are positively obsessed with what does not happen in the 




who seemed insufficiently grief-stricken after the disappearance of his wife, Laci. 
Public qualms were exacerbated by the subsequent discovery that he had been 
making plans with his mistress, Amber Frey, a true-crime drama that so captivated 
public attention that it became a movie-of-the-week.31 Or those more literarily 
inclined might recall the existential dilemma of Camus’s stranger, whose lack of 
mourning for his dead mother loomed large in the puzzle of his execution for an 
apparently motiveless crime which would close with the expected retributive cries of 
hate. In 1474, the clerk outed himself along similar lines. The greatest problem for 
the alleged coconspirators was that the nefarious truth of their deed was more 
probable than the false yet potentially verisimilar interpretation of the signs. Their 
(mis)representation failed to convince as theater. 
Betrayed by the absence of detectible emotion, the clerk was the first to elicit 
mistrust not for what he did but for what he failed to do, not for what happened, but 
for what did not happen. Instead of the expected signs of lamentation or anger, the 
public found nothing: “He was going about the city without giving the slightest 
indication of either mourning or anger [et, la raison, car il alloit parmi la cité et 
n’en faisoit quelque estime de deul ne de coroulx]” (CPV, vol. III, p. 34; my 
emphasis), to which another almost indignant chronicler adds that “a loyal and 
faithful servant should be sorrowful at the bad fortune of his master” (CVM, p. 414). 
It is nothing if not ironic that the Messin community seems to have expected more 
mourning from Didier’s employee than from his widow, whose performances are 
unseen, unobserved, or irrelevant, at least to the chroniclers. 
Regardless of the realities that lay beneath the appearances that the Messins 
were interpreting, both parties were to be arrested: the clerk, for failing to display 
what was not there, and Isabel, for failing to display what was or, at least, what 
might well have been. Recall that Philippe had earlier specified that, immediately 
after the fatal blow, Isabel was “greatly sad and grief-stricken” (CPV, vol. III, p. 34). 
In an interpretive stance familiar to theorists of race, class, and gender, who have 
become accustomed to reading silences and absences, suspicion falls on her because 
of what people have not seen in him. It is as if, post hoc, her performances, feigned 
or genuine, don’t really matter at all. 
 
Act V: Arrests and Interrogations. Because of the clerk’s suspicious 
behavioral omissions, Isabel’s own comportment was scrutinized as well. After 
disclosing her recent childbirth, Philippe relates the immediate arrest of the clerk 
and, almost as an afterthought, that of Isabel: “And thus, he was arrested and placed 
in the city jail; and so was his aforesaid mistress, who had just recently given birth 
to a child and had been considering marrying the aforesaid clerk” (CPV, vol. III, p. 
34). After the arrests, the police separate the pair, the better to test their stories by 
employing techniques still in use to this day: they use any trickery, pretense, 
dissemblance, or deception likely to elicit a confession. (One need only think of the 
play-acting currently associated with that most dangerous and seemingly successful 
“game” of “good cop/bad cop”, which appears to have been just as effective in the 
fifteenth century.) In the denouement of the legal drama of 1474, the absence of 
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feigning by adulterous pretenders is trumped by the presence of feigning by the 
police. 
Although he was something of a public figure,32 Philippe was almost certainly 
not present at these interrogations; even so, he preserves a startling inside look into 
late-medieval police procedure or, at a minimum, into how Messins perceived those 
procedures. Modern readers might consider the primacy of confession frighteningly 
“medieval” but the reality is that confessions very much remain the “queen of 
proofs” by dint of their having been uttered by the sole individuals privy to the truth: 
the perpetrators. Technically speaking, modern courts discourage police deception; 
but their trickery is often upheld because of other ambiguities in the law.33 
Perhaps owing to his professional expertise in juridical style and practice, the 
clerk resists the trickery, initially holding his own against the ruses of the police and 
refusing to confess. For her own part, the possibly innocent Isabel lacks that 
experience, so she is no match for the excellent acting skills of the police. To 
employ the American vernacular, the police “flip her” with a convincing lie that 
Isabel deems credible: that the clerk has already confessed to everything. Once he is 
brought before her to see the truth of her confession rather than hear a police lie 
about it, he too confesses. Of special relevance to the interrelations of truth, law, and 
theatricality is Philippe’s recreation of these events as a dialogic drama, complete 
with imaginary quotations recorded as authentic, reported speech. This is a practice 
well known to medievalists from a variety of historiographies. Letters of remission, 
for instance, often play out with such reconstructed dialogues; the quodlibetal 
disputations of medieval French scholasticism survive in abrégés that feature similar 
recollections of reported speech, and, perhaps most germane of all, the presence of 
dialogue has long assisted scholars in unearthing the origins of medieval drama 
itself.34 Seen from that perspective, Philippe’s own learned reimagining of this tale 
of true crime is as legalistic as it is theatrical, as theatrical as it is legalistic: 
 
This clerk held firm and was determined to defend himself, nor did he ever wish to 
confess, that is until the police convinced his aforesaid mistress that he (who was in 
a different jail), had already told them everything and confessed [jusque ad ce que 
Justice fist acroire à la dicte sa maîtresse]. And then, thinking that it was all true, 
and also, with [false] hope that she was being that that she might be shown some 
mercy, she too confessed the whole thing, and spoke thus: “Alas!”, said she, “how 
                                                
32 For his status in Metz as an important businessman who kept a certain distance from 
politics, see ed. Bruneau, CPV, vol. I, p. vi-vii. 
33 Peters, Torture, op. cit., chap. 2. Obviously, the subject is far too vast to be treated 
adequately within the scope of the present study but see the classic, if older survey by W. S. 
White, “Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
127, 1979, p. 581-629; see also P. Brooks, “Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law 
and Literature”, Law’s Stories, ed. Brooks and Gewirtz, p. 114-134. 
34 For recorded speech in letters of remission, see N. Z. Davis, Fiction in the Archives, op. cit., 
introd. and chap. 1; for the quodlibetal abrégé, see my “The Theatre of Scholastic Erudition”, 
Comparative Drama, 27, 1993, p. 341-363; and, as related to the origins of medieval drama, 




could he have told you?”35 And, immediately thereafter, the aforesaid clerk was 
brought before her; he being much astonished when he heard the confession of his 
mistress. (CPV, vol. III, p. 34; my emphasis). 
 
 
A final question now arises, insofar as the evidence about Isabel’s own role 
in the murder is either absent or contradictory. Is it not possible that she was 
innocent? 
Although that possibility does not appear to have crossed her interrogators’ 
minds, that does not mean that it should not cross ours. Philippe never truly accepts 
Isabel’s agency, instead emphasizing his reluctance to reject the truth of her noble 
appearance: “this aforesaid woman was of good lineage and from a good family; and 
was the most beautiful and amiable woman you could ever find, and so much more 
gracious than others, about whom no one had ever heard anything but good things.” 
He even adds that “one could easily have considered half of the entire female 
population of Metz before ever suspecting her” (CPV, vol. III, p. 35; my emphasis). 
His message? Appearances can be deceiving. It is up to the law to penetrate them 
with appearances and realities of its own, in this case, culminating in an especially 
merciless punishment reserved for Isabel.36 
 
Act VI: Two Spectacular Death Penalties.The absence of marital affection 
has begotten a coerced, adulterous relationship, which may well have led to the 
physical begetting of a child (otherwise absent from the narrative). The truth of the 
murder of Didier Baillat has been discovered legally by the absence of evidence of 
mourning. And the criminals’ failure to provide a real or feigned display of their 
absent or present grief now leads to the theatrical denouement of the death penalty, 
death being the ultimate absence. Philippe’s narrative ends where such narratives 
usually do: with the restoration of legal order when a large crowd attends the 
double-execution. Since the pair was put to death on a holiday, Philippe reports that 
“to witness justice being done, there were more people than anyone had ever seen in 
Metz for this execution”, owing to “all manner of merchants and fair-goers who 
were coming and going on the day on account of the holiday and they stopped off to 
see the execution” (CPV, vol. III, p. 34-35). True, Philippe does tend toward 
hyperbole, introducing each new juridical supplice as the most spectacular and 
original execution of its kind.37 That said, the veritable portraiture of 1474 was 
indeed cruel and unusual. After the typical shameful parade through town in a cart, 
the bodies of the two perpetrators were made to allegorize their crimes. The clerk’s 
two hands were dismembered, presumably to exemplify, on one hand, his “theft” of 
Didier’s wife and, on the other hand, his subsequent delivery of the fatal blow. He 
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was then decapitated and his head displayed at the Bridge of the Dead with the 
murder weapon hanging alongside it.38 As for Isabel, her poignant pleas for the 
merciful “favor” of decapitation fell upon deaf ears. Terrified by the flames, she 
begged for the same swifter punishment that had been accorded to the clerk but she 
was refused: 
 
And the bourgeoise was burned at the stake, notwithstanding that she was begging 
the court most piteously that they cut off her head instead on account of the 
tremendous fear she had of the flames that terrified her; but her prayers did her no 
good. And it all happened on the Day of Saint Eligius that justice was done. (CPV, 
vol. III, p. 34-35). 
 
So it was that the city of Metz and all its visitors experienced the cathartic 
spectacle of seeing justice done, a phenomenon ever as crucial to theater as it is to 
law. Whatever scholarly doubts may endure about what Aristotle truly meant in 
Poetics 1449b when he urged that the authors of tragedy craft their art “not through 
narrating the thing, but through pity and fear expressed by the deeds, in that way 
purging and relieving all such violent disturbances of the soul”, the righting of 
wrongs through the enactment of the death penalty has long been associated not only 
with deterrence but with a legal brand of catharsis called solacio. For example, the 
legal teachings of Callistratus preserved in the Digest of Justinian invoked a site-
specific catharsis that was to attend the death penalty with a metatheatrical 
vocabulary to match: 
 
The practice approved by most authorities has been to hang notorious brigands on a 
gallows in the place which they used to haunt, so that by the spectacle others may be 
deterred [ut et conspectu dettereantur] from the same crimes, and so that it may, 
when the penalty has been carried out, bring comfort [solacio] to the relatives and 
kin of those killed in that place where the brigands committed their murders…39 
 
But why was Isabel treated so heartlessly? In his moralizing conclusion, 
Philippe goes so far as to attribute any agency she might have had to that master 
puppeteer, the Devil himself (l’Annemy). This is a sinister mode of legal 
ratiocination that is as counterintuitive as it is habitual in such histories as that of the 
prosecution of witchcraft. That is to say that, in characterizing murderous female 
agency as diabolical in origins, Philippe is able to effect a logical reversal that 
denies any real female agency at the very moment that that agency is punished 
severely:40 “And you should know, as I’ve often said, that the Devil had had a hand 
in all this. And this clerk had only been there for half the year; and it was at an evil 
                                                
38 See my “Memories and Allegories of the Death Penalty: Back to the Medieval Future?”, 
Thinking Allegory Otherwise, ed. B. Machosky, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009, 
p. 37-59. 
39 Digest of Justinian, trans. Watson, ed. Mommsen, op. cit., vol. II, bk. 48, chap. 19, sec. 
28.15. 
40 “Violence, Silence, and the Memory of Witches”, Violence Against Women in Medieval 




hour that he ever came there.” Performances absent or unseen have led to the 
discovery of criminal agency seen, acknowledged, punished, and, for Isabel, also 
denied. Afterward, Philippe follows the climax of his account with a distinctive 
anticlimax, abruptly and hastily leaving off with the medieval equivalent of “time to 
move on” or “gotta run”, as in “I have other matters I want to discuss [car je veult 
pairler d’aultre besoingne]” (CPV, vol. III, p. 35). 
In the final analysis, the murder of Didier Baillat sheds new light on medieval 
conceptions of theatricality and metatheatricality in everyday life. It also permits a 
historical perspective on such superb scholarship as Umberto Eco’s “Interpreting 
Drama”, in which he draws upon Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis to propose a 
veritable taxonomy of pretense both on stage and off. When pondering deceptions, 
representations, and misrepresentations, for instance, Eco cites the deliberate 
creation of a “false natural event, as when I purposely produce a false imprint in 
order to fool somebody. I can produce a false symptom by painting red spots on my 
face to pretend I have measles.”41 While medievalists rightly gravitate toward Faux-
Semblant of the Roman de la Rose for an understanding of such concepts, it is 
theater that codifies and enactswhat it means to represent and to misrepresent. Under 
ordinary circumstances, theater is not deliberate deception; it is deliberate 
representation. 
John Searle brings a welcome clarification to that state of affairs, arguing 
that: “In one sense of ‘pretend’, to pretend to be or to do something that one is not 
doing is to engage in a form of deception, but in the second sense of ‘pretend’, to 
pretend to do or be something is to engage in a performance which is as if one were 
doing or being the thing and is without any intent to deceive.”42 Theatrical 
verisimilitude is the great “as if” whereas the law and its spectacular forensic 
rhetorical practices seek the truth of an “as was”. The problem is that observers, 
audiences, and juries are habituated to understanding an “as if” from the conventions 
of fiction and that, in the law, those “as ifs” emerge as truths that may well be 
constructed creatively upon the flimsiest of probabilities. Despite centuries of 
antitheatrical polemic that equates theater with lies, theater is representation, not 
misrepresentation. It is not theatrical plotting per se that is dangerous but, rather, 
emplotment as criminal conspiracy in real life. 
In 1474, the Devil worked fast and so did the law. Faster than one could ever 
suspect. Faster than suspicions can be formed based on the absence of evidence. 
Faster than one has time to perceive a moral to the story that is even more troubling 
than that which Philippe announced: moralizing about theater is the ultimate 
pretense. It preempts ethical discussions about the law by disguising the flaws in the 
law itself as spectacular lies, even though the law is ever reliant on the conventions 
of the very theater it denies. 
 
 
                                                
41 Eco, “Interpreting Drama”, The Limits of Interpretation, Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press, 1990, p. 105; and E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974. 
42 Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, New Literary History, 6, 1975, p. 319-
332, p. 324-325, his emphasis. 
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[Prologue] Item, en celluy tamps, advint plusieurs adventure, tant en Mets comme 
aultre part. Entre lesquelles en avint une en la dicte cité bien estrainge et malvaixe, 
et de laquelles plusieurs gens furent bien esmerveilliés. Le cas fut telz que, en celluy 
tamps, en la dicte cité, y avoit ung riche merchamps, lequelle alors demouroit en 
ycelle, entre la plaisse c’on dit la plesse Xaipel et Fornerue. Et estoit à luy tout ce 
biaulx menoir et celle haulte maison qui contient depuis celle dicte plesse jusques en 
Fornerue; et vait celle maison respondre du cousté du derrier jusques en la rue c’on 
dit la Court de Raisier. Celluy merchamps se appelloit Dediet Baillot; et tenoit grant 
gravités, car il estoit fort cencés et arantés; et hantoit tousjourz la seigneurie. Et, 
pour ce qu’il avoit four et mollins et plusieurs aultre héritaiges, il avoit 
cotumièrement ung clerc du stille du Pallas en sa maison, qui le servoit à touttes ces 
affaire. Cy avint qu’il en print ung qui estoit ung biaulx jonne gallans, et bien stillés. 
Et, quant ledit Dediet alloit en quelque part, fût de nuyt ou de jour, il le menoit avec 
luy pour le conduire, puis retournoit ledit clerc à l’ostel. Or avoit celluy Dediet 
Baillot apousés l’une des belle bourgeoise de la cité de Mets, et une femme doulce, 
débonnaire et honnestes, et, avec ce, de bon pairaige, de bon fame, et estimée femme 
de biens et de bonne réputacion de tous les citains de Mets. Mais ledit Dediet, son 
mary, non comptent d’elle, estoit nottés qu’il en entrenoit d’aultre; et, de fait, il n’en 
bougeoit de nuyt ne de jour, ne le plus souvant ne retournoit à couchier en sa maison 
qu’il ne fût mynuyt. [ACT I] Et tellement que le dyable ce y bouta et tanta ledit 
clerc de l’amour de sa maîtresse. Et tant espia qu’il vit quel geste et contenance son 
dit maistre faisoit quant il retournoit de nuyt à l’ostel et que la maîtresse estoit 
couchée: car, alors, ledit Dediet ce boutoit auprès d’elle au lit, et, sans mot dire, se 
couchoit. Par quoy ledit clerc, come moy, l’escripvains de ces présente, l’ais oy dire 
et effermer à ceulx qui journellement hantoient le dit clerc, et le devoient bien 
sçavoir, une nuyt qu’il sçavoit que son maistre ne retorneroit point à l’ostel, s’en alla 
secrètement couchier de cost ladicte sa maîtresse; et, après plusieurs chose, faindant 
qu’il fût ledit son maistre,/// olt la compaignie de sa maîtresse. Mais, comme il est à 
croire, essés tost elle s’en aperseut. Néantmoins c’estoit tropts tairt: et, comme le 
clerc la humiliait de ces parolle en luy desclairant la vie que son maistre menoit, et 
plusieurs aultre besoingne, et tellement que petit à petit l’aprivoisa, et la mist du tout 
à sa cordelle. 
[ACT II] Dedier Baillat, riche merchans de Mets, tués de son clerc. --Et, après 
plusieurs aultre chose faictes et dicte, non comptant de la vie qu’il menoient et de la 
bonne chier qu’il faisoient, le dyable les tantait d’omicide, et olt la dicte bourgeoise 
promesse avec le dit clerc d’estre consentent de la mort dudit Dediet, son mary. Et 
tellement que, le XVIIIe jour du moix de jung, celluy clerc, en alumant son maistre, 
qui alloit a retrait, le tuait d’ung pétal à quoy on s’aide à broyer saulce; et, ce fait, 
le vint dire à sa maîtresse. Et elle, voyant son mary mort, fut fort triste et dollante. 
Touteffois, il n’y ait remède; le copt est fait. [ACT III] Cy l’ont quaichiez derrier 




clerc, et le portait couchiez estandus sus ung sciège devent l’ostel le Burton, qui est 
au debout de la rue des Bons Anffans, essés près de la Teste d’or, affin qu’il fût 
cuydé que aulcuns ces mal vueullent l’eussent illec despechiez de nuyt. Et, le 
lendemain, qu’estoit ung dimenche, fut trouvé. Par quoy incontinent furent prins 
plusieurs, qui rien n’en sçavoient; [ACT IV] mais, à la fin, ledit clerc fut 
suspeccionés; et, la raison, car il alloit parmi la cité et n’en faisoit quelque estime 
de deul ne de coroulx. [ACT V] Cy fut incontinent prins et mis en l’ostel du doien 
de la ville; et aussy fut la dicte sa maîtresse, laquelle tout nouvellement estoit 
relevée d’anffans, et avoit délibérés de apouser ledit son clerc. Celluy clerc tenoit 
bon et estoit bien déliberés de soubtenir son cas, ne jamaix ne voult confesser jusque 
ad ce que Justice fist acroire à la dicte sa maîtresse que luy, qui estoit en unne aultre 
prison, avoit tout dit et confessés. Et, alors, cuydant qu’il fût vray, et aussy avec 
l’espérance que l’on luy donnoit de la prandre à misericorde, elle confessait le tout, 
et dit ainsy: « Hélas! », dit-elle, « le vous ait il dit? » Et incontinent fut amenés ledit 
clerc devent elle; lequelle fut bien esbahis quant il oyt la confession de sa maîtresse. 
[ACT VI] Le clerc exécutés par justices, et la feme dudit Dedier brullée. --Et tantost 
en fut justice faictes; et furent traynés sus la brouuette, et menés a pont des Mors. Le 
clerc eust premier les deux mains coppées, et puis la teste; et fut le pétal duquel il 
avoit fait le copt pandus et estaichiés en hault, contre la lance et a plus près d’icelle 
teste. Et la bourjoise fut arse et brullée, néantmoins que moult piteusement prioit à 
Justice c’on luy voulcist copper la teste, pour la grant doubte du feu qu’elle 
craindoit; mais rien ne luy vallust sa prière. Et fut ce fait le jour de la sainct Éloy que 
celle justice fut acomplie. Pour laquelle à veoir y olt autant de peuple que jamaix on 
heust veu en Mets à faire justice: car touttes manier de gens fourains que à ce jour 
alloient ou venoient à Sainct Éloy ce arestoient illec pour veoir l’esécussion. Et 
sçaichiez, comme j’ai dit devent, que l’Annemy y avoit bien ouvrez: car la dicte 
femme estoit de bon paraige et de gens de bien, et estoit la plus belle et amiable 
femme que l’on sceust trouver, et la plus gracieuse des aultres, de laquelle on n’avoit 
jamaix ouy dire que tout bien. Et eust on prins la moitiet de touctes les femme de 
Mets devent que on l’eust heu suspect. Et n’y avoit que demi ans que cellui clerc 
estoit léans; et à la mal heure y vint il oncquez. 
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